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COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V. WEAVER:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE "PERVASIVELY
SECTARIAN" DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Colorado Christian Universi-
ty v. Weaver' reflects the chaotic state of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. This chaos stems from the very nature of religion, as well as the
inherent tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. The Supreme Court's proliferation of competing, contrasting,
and confusing opinions fails to provide legislatures and lower courts with
meaningful guidelines when considering government action that pene-
trates the religious sphere. The Constitution demands more than a "when
we see establishment we'll know it" mentality; it demands a consistent,
logical interpretation. While the disjointed collection of Supreme Court
opinions ostensibly reflects an ineffective bench, the true culprit of con-
fusion lies in the language of the Religion Clauses. With such an im-
movable obstacle recognized, the American people need to rectify the
situation and clarify the principles through ratification of a Constitutional
Amendment.
Weaver displays the problem of attempting to legislate publicly
funded scholarships in the midst of contradictory case law. Many of
Colorado's publicly funded scholarships share two eligibility require-
ments: (1) A student must attend an institution of higher education, and
(2) the institution must not be "pervasively sectarian" as a matter of state
law.2 When Colorado enacted the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine in
1977, it attempted "to make funds available as broadly as was thought
permissible under the Supreme Court's then-existing Establishment
Clause doctrine.",3 Ironically, because of the Supreme Court's subse-
quent banishment of the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine, the only way to
fulfill the original goal of Colorado's scholarship legislation was to find
it unconstitutional.
Part I of this Comment discusses the inherent tension between the
Religion Clauses, and summarizes the competing approaches employed
to analyze Establishment Clause cases. Part II reviews the Court's at-
1. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 1250-51. The scholarships include: Colorado Leveraging Education Assistant
Partnership Program; Supplemental Leveraging Education Assistant Partnership Program; Colorado
Student Grants; Colorado Work Study; and College Opportunity Fund. These scholarships are
administered by the Colorado Commission on Higher Education. Id. at 1250.
3. Id. at 1251.
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tempt at creating an enduring standard in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 as well as
how the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine fits into the Lemon Test. Part
III documents the beginnings of change in Establishment Clause inter-
pretation as displayed by Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District5
and Agostini v. Felton.6 Part IV reviews the landmark decision of Mit-
chell v. Helms,7 where the Court explicitly "buried" the "pervasively
sectarian" doctrine. Part V analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the
Establishment Clause after Mitchell, which exemplifies the pervasively
sectarian debacle. Part VI concludes that the chaotic state of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence reflects the insuperable conflict inherent in
the language of the Religion Clauses and calls for a constitutional
amendment to define the boundary of government interaction with reli-
gion.
I. THE INHERENT TENSION IN THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. An Amendment Divided Cannot Stand
The Religion Clauses, encompassing the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, state: "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
,8 While the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause share
in the protection of religious freedom, the language employed to create
that protection often places them in tension.9 For example, a prison
broadcast of religious programming on inmates' televisions may be
viewed as the government establishing religion, while failure to provide
such programming may be viewed as denying inmates the right to exer-
cise their religion freely. 10 Chief Justice Burger described the language
of the Religion clauses as "at best opaque,"'1 and candidly acknowledged
that the Court "can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible
government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudica-
tion.,,12
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
6. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
7. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1182-83
(3d ed. 2006) ("Government actions to facilitate free exercise might be challenged as impermissible
establishments, and government efforts to refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as
denying the free exercise of religion."). Chief Justice Burger echoed this sentiment when he noted
that "[t]he Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
10. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1183 (using a military chaplain example to describe
the inherent struggle between the two clauses).
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
12. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
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While the constitutional language and the exact boundaries of gov-
ernment action may be unclear, there are two general guidelines that the
Supreme Court has been consistent in upholding. First, early in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, the Court rejected the argument that every form of
public financial aid to religious institutions violates the Religion Claus-
es.' 3 The Supreme Court has stood by this notion that "[i]nteraction be-
tween church and state is inevitable, and [the Court has] always tolerated
some level of involvement between the two.' 14  Second, the Court has
also made clear that the Establishment Clause "means at least this: Nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.' ' 15 These
two guidelines place a large fence around the Establishment Clause. On
one end, the Government is forbidden from creating a state church, and
on the other end, the Government must provide general welfare (police,
fire, sanitation) to religious institutions. While this fence provides some
guidance, there is still too much room for interpretation, and the Court
has struggled with drawing a hard line.
B. Lost in Interpretation
The Supreme Court's inability to "establish a clear or practical con-
stitutional standard"'16 results in uncertainty for lower courts.' 7 While the
Justices appear to agree on the general concept of "separation of church
and state," the variety of approaches employed to define the proper de-
gree of separation represent the underlying discord. 18 In fact, Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence appears so convoluted that scholars and
commentators disagree as to the correct number of approaches. 19 Ac-
cording to the most liberal counting, six approaches materialize from the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence: (1) Separation; (2)
13. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298 (1899) ("That the influence of any particular
church may be powerful over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation, incorporated
for a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers, is surely not sufficient to convert such a
corporation into a religious or sectarian body.").
14. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (citation omitted).
15. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
16. Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment
Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 534 (1990).
17. David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 395, 413 (1989) ("Lower courts lack certainty in
determining which doctrinal viewpoint to apply in the Lemon analysis."); see also Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) ("The case's tortuous history over the next 15 years indicates well
the degree to which our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while never-
theless retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle.").
18. JOHN WrrrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 188 (2d
ed. 2005) ("The only 'first principle' that the Court has consistently invoked is that of 'separation of
church and state,' .... [Tihe Court has developed a number of unique, and often sharply juxtaposed,
approaches.").
19. Compare CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1192-93, 1196 (describing three approaches: (1)
strict separation; (2) neutrality; and (3) accommodation/equality), and Rezai, supra note 16, at 507-
16, 521-25 (describing three approaches: (1) strict separation; (2) accommodation; and (3) flexible
accommodation), with WrTE JR, supra note 18, at 188 (outlining six approaches: (1) "separation-
ism"; (2) "accomodationism"; (3) neutrality; (4) endorsement; (5) coercion; and (6) equal treatment).
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Accommodation; (3) Neutrality; (4) Endorsement; (5) Coercion; and (6)
Equal Treatment. However, both Endorsement and Equal Treatment
appear to be mere tests used to assess Neutrality. Therefore, this Com-
ment proposes four distinct approaches:
1. Separation
Separation promotes the notion that "to the greatest extent possible
government and religion should be separated. 2° Justice Jackson, writing
for the dissent in Everson, echoed Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a wall
separating church and state21 by declaring that any form of public aid
was forbidden under the First Amendment.2 2 Everson itself takes a mod-
erate separationist approach by holding that the challenged government
action-reimbursing sectarian student's parents for bus transportation-
was permissible.23
2. Accommodation
The second approach to Establishment Clause interpretation has
been termed "Accommodation." Under this theory, the Court should
"recognize the importance of religion in society and accommodate its
presence in government., 24 The Accomodation approach has its roots in
the eighteenth-century Puritan and Civic Republican groups. The
Court in Zorach v. Clausen first articulated the Accommodation ap-
proach by upholding the constitutionality of a New York regulation that
allowed for the early release of students in order to attend religious ser-
26vices.
While acknowledging the ideal of separation of church and state,
the Zorach Court rejected the notion that church and state are to be sepa-
rated in all situations.2 7 The Court's reasoning centered around the tradi-
20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1192.
21. Id. (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a
Comm. of the Danbury Baptist Assoc. (Jan. 1, 1802), in WRrTINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984)). The majority also uses Jefferson's metaphor. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall of separation between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."). How-
ever, the majority's holding-affirming the constitutionality of the reimbursement of bus fare for
sectarian school children-appears to contradict the spirit of this Jeffersonian rhetoric. See id. at 18.
22. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting) ("The Amendment's purpose ... was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public
aid or support for religion.").
23. See id. at 18.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1196.
25. WrrrE JR., supra note 18, at 191. Founders representing these groups argued that gov-
ernments "must support some form of public religion, some common morals and mores to undergird
and support the plurality of protected private religions." Id.
26. 343 U.S. 306, 308 & n.1, 315 (1952); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3210 (McKinney
2009).
27. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 ("The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State .... Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.").
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tional acceptance of religion in our society. 28 Thus, five years after the
separationist decision in Everson, the Court turned to a contrasting ac-
commodationist approach.
3. Neutrality
After creating two competing approaches, the Court fell to the mid-
dle road with the principle of Neutrality. Under the Neutrality approach,
the First Amendment requires that government be neutral towards reli-
gion. The shared principle of Neutrality existed in both the separationist
Everson decision, as well as the accommodationist Zorach decision.29
Neutrality represented an attempt at an integrated, consistent standard,
and was first manifested in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
30
While the test put forth in Lemon stands as the accepted test to de-
termine neutrality, three competing tests have emerged to assess a regu-
lation's neutrality. First, some Justices favor establishing neutrality
through a "symbolic endorsement test"-whether a reasonable person
passing by the religious symbol would conclude that the government is
endorsing religion.31  Even among those advancing the symbolic en-
dorsement test, disputes arise as to the proper perspective from which to
apply it.
32
The second competing test to establish neutrality is Equal Treat-
ment. Similar to Endorsement, Equal Treatment can be viewed as a
measure of neutrality. In certain situations, Endorsement would prohibit
government funding or alliances with religion because it may give the
appearance of government advancing religion. However, Equal Treat-
ment "allow[s] such funding and alliances so long as nonreligious parties
similarly situated receive comparable treatment., 33 On a practical level,
Equal Treatment has some appeal because it creates neutrality between
aid given to religious and secular institutions. Yet, we must still be wary
28. The Court supports the traditionalism argument by noting the religious nature of our
country, and that, "[wihen the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions." Id. at 313-14.
29. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("[The First]
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers .... State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religion, than it is to favor
them."), with Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 ("The government must be neutral when it comes to competi-
tion between sects.").
30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,763-64 (1995).
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1194-95 (discussing the contrasting views of the Justices
in what government actions constitute "symbolic endorsement" of religion). Justices Scalia, Rehn-
quist, Kennedy, and Thomas reject the symbolic endorsement test. See id. at 1195. Justices
O'Connor, Souter and Breyer believe the symbolic endorsement test should be applied from an
informed reasonable person standard, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg believe that Justice
O'Connor enhances the reasonable person standard, and the test should be considered from the
perspective of a tort law reasonable person standard. Id. at 1194-95.
33. WTrE JR, supra note 18, at 199.
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of the dangers that lurk upon such a slippery path. The Constitution bars
more than the establishment of religion; it bars laws "respecting" the
establishment of religion. Therefore, even a foot in the door towards an
establishment of religion can be unconstitutional.
Finally, the most recent method used to assess neutrality is based
upon determining whether government funds were channeled through an
individual, and therefore, whether the allocation of those funds to any
institution was the complete private and independent choice of the indi-
vidual. If government funds wind up in a pervasively sectarian institu-
tion, it was the individual's choice and, as such, the government has not
aided that institution.
4. Coercion
The Coercion approach goes beyond accommodation and endorse-
ment by finding a violation of the Establishment Clause only when gov-
ernment action effectively coerces people to "support or participate in
any religion or its exercise ... Perhaps the clearest articulation of
the coercion approach occurred in the majority's opinion in Lee v. Weis-
man.35 In Lee, the Court confronted a case involving a high school prin-
cipal who invited a rabbi to pray at the high school graduation.16 The
Court found that the principal's actions violated the Establishment
Clause, and based its finding on the inherently impressionable nature of
elementary and high school students.3 7 Elementary and high school aged
children are impressionable, and when effectively forced to attend a
graduation ceremony that mandates prayer, a coercive environment has
been created.a
These vastly differing approaches to Establishment Clause interpre-
tation leave lower courts, and legislatures, to guess at which approach
will prevail on any given statutory challenge.39 One commentator aptly
described the situation by stating that, "[b]y 1985, these cases ... began
increasingly to 'partake of the prolixity' of a bizarre byzantine code."
4 0
Commentators are not the only ones left perplexed; even Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist displayed frustration at the current state of the law:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may
34. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989).
35. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
36. Id. at 581.
37. Id. at 592.
38. Id. ("As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom
of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.").
39. Felsen, supra note 17, at 419 ("The Supreme Court's failure to adopt one clear doctrinal
viewpoint has resulted in inconsistencies at all levels of constitutional adjudication.").
40. WITTE JR, supra note 18, at 210.
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lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a
film of George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus render-
ing them nonreusable.
41
II. SETTING THE GROUND RULES: LEMON V. KURTZMAN
42
The Court's 1971 decision in Lemon attempted to create an inte-
grated standard by distilling a three prong test, the "Lemon Test," from
previous opinions.43 The Lemon Test, while modified in Agostini, has
for more than three decades remained the only formal standard of review
for claims arising under the Establishment Clause.44 Yet this broad ana-
lytical framework, much like the initial fence created in Bradfield, left
room for too much "play in the joints'A5 and wound up allowing the
competing approaches of the Justices to dictate the outcome of the case.
A. Background: The Pre-Lemon Cases
1. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township4
Everson presented the Court with the first opportunity to decide an
Establishment Clause claim brought against a state government. The
application of the First Amendment to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment facilitated the Court's examination of a New Jersey statute.
The New Jersey statute provided funds to reimburse parents of private
school children for bus fare to the school. While the tenor of the opinion
exuded separationism, the Court found that the New Jersey statute failed
to breach the wall between church and state. 47 The Court classified the
busing reimbursement as public welfare, and analogized it to providing
police, fire, and sanitation services to churches.48 Yet, neutrality rhetoric
managed to sneak into an ostensibly separationist opinion.49 Even at the
advent of Establishment Clause cases induced by state action, the Court
failed to provide a uniform standard, as evidenced by the undermining of
41. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43. Id. at 612-13.
44. WITrE JR, supra note 18, at 188. While the Lemon Test stands as the only formal stan-
dard of review, the individual Justices have developed a myriad of approaches to adjudicating cases
under this test, including "separationism," "accommodationsim," neutrality, endorsement, coercion,
and equal treatment. Id.
45. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970).
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 17-18.
49. Id. at 18.
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the majority's proclamations of strict separation by an outcome that pro-
motes neutrality.5°
2. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York5'
The next milestone on the journey towards Lemon stemmed from
New York's tax laws. In Walz, a real estate owner brought suit against
the state of New York claiming that a state statute exempting religious
organizations from paying property tax violated the Establishment
Clause.52 While adhering to a separationist approach, the language used
by the Court in stating the standard displayed the underlying uncertainty
in the proper analysis. Justice Burger mixed the phrase "room for play in
the joints" with separationist rhetoric in laying forth the applicable stan-
dard. He inserted this ambiguous language for fear of imposing too rigid
a standard.53 This simple phrase, "room for play in the joints," reinforces
the move away from consistency and towards subjective judicial discre-
tion. However, as a precursor to the Lemon Test, the Court identified the
importance of the purpose and effect of government action.54
B. Facts of Lemon
In 1968, Pennsylvania passed the Nonpublic Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act,55 which authorized the superintendent to purchase
specific secular educational materials for nonpublic schools. These ma-
terials included secular textbooks, actual expenditures for teachers' sala-
ries, and other instructional material. A year later, Rhode Island passed
the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act,56 which provided public funds
to supplement nonpublic school teachers' salaries.57
C. The Lemon Test
In setting a standard to analyze this case, the Court drew upon prior
decisions to focus its interpretation and create a lasting standard: (1) the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's principal
or primary effect must be one that neither enhances or inhibits religion;
50. Justice Jackson's dissent chastised the majority for such doublespeak. Id. at 19 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separa-
tion of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters."). Justice Jackson's sentiments foreshadowed the difficult road
ahead.
51. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
52. Id. at 666.
53. Id. at 669 ("[Rligidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions .....
54. Justice Burger frames the question by asking "whether particular acts in question are
intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so."
Id. (emphasis added).
55. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5608 (repealed 1977).
56. R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (repealed 1980).
57. The Rhode Island statute limited the aid to supplementing salaries of teachers who taught
secular subjects, and such supplements could not elevate a private school teacher's salary above that
of a public school teacher. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
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The first prong is at best an academic exercise for the statute's pro-
ponents. Showing the existence of a secular purpose merely requires the
proponent of the statute to imagine any possible secular goal served by a
particular statute. 9 In the case of Lemon, both Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island argued that the statute served the secular purpose of improving
secular education at both public and private schools. 60 This broad legis-
lative purpose satisfied the Court, which explicitly noted the importance
of imparting deference to legislatures.61
2. Secular Effect
The secular effect prong of the Lemon Test provides for greater
analysis than the secular purpose inquiry. The Court frames the question
as whether the government action "will in part have the effect of advanc-
ing [or inhibiting] religion., 62 In Lemon, the Court forwent deciding the
effect question, and instead rested its analysis on an excessive entangle-
ment of government and religion.
3. No Excessive Entanglement
In order to determine whether the government has created an exces-
sive entanglement with religion, courts must consider (1) "the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited," (2) "the nature of the
aid that the State provides," and (3) "the resulting relationship between
the government and the religious authority.,
63
It is under the first consideration of the entanglement inquiry that
we find the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine. The term "Pervasively Sec-
tarian" was coined by Justice Powell when he stated:
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, for the plurality, concluded that despite
some institutional rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively
sectarian, but held open that possibility for future cases: "Individual
projects can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with
58. Id. at 612-13.
59. Rezai, supra note 16, at 518.
60. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
61. Id. at 613 ("As in Allen, we find nothing here that undermines the stated legislative intent;
it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference.").
62. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
63. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented to
show that the institution does in fact possess these characteristics."
'64
The Court in Lemon found that providing aid to a school whose re-
ligious nature is so pervasive that there can be no distinction between
secular and sectarian education was unconstitutional.65  Thus, Lemon
cemented the Pervasively Sectarian doctrine as a pillar of the entangle-
ment inquiry.
In observance of Lemon, Colorado's legislature, hoping to provide
as many students as possible with aid for college, drafted the require-
ments for its publicly funded scholarships. Those requirements con-
tained a provision prohibiting disbursement of scholarship funds to stu-
dents who attended "pervasively sectarian" institutions.
66
I1. WINDS OF CHANGE: ZOBREST, AGOSTINI, AND "PRIVATE CHOICE"
Zobrest and Agostini set the stage for the eventual dissolution of the
"pervasively sectarian" doctrine. Zobrest displayed the Court's new-
found silence on the "pervasively sectarian" issue. Agostini modified the
Lemon Test by folding the entanglement inquiry into the effect prong.
Zobrest's silence weakened the precedent backing "pervasively secta-
rian" analysis, and Agostini's modification weakened the power of the
"pervasively sectarian" inquiry by rendering excessive entanglement no
longer dispositive, but merely a factor used to analyze secular effect.
A. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
67
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)68 provides
federal funding "to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary
tools to improve educational results for children with disabilities ....
James Zobrest had been deaf since birth, and when James attended a
public junior high school, the State provided him with a sign-language
interpreter.70  The case arose when, at the beginning of high school,
James enrolled at Salpointe Catholic High School, a sectarian institu-
tion.71 When James requested that the school district furnish him with an
interpreter at his new school, his request was denied.72
64. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 682 (1970)).
65. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616 ("The substantial religious character of these church-related
schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to
avoid.").
66. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-3.5-102(3)(b), -3.3-101(3)(d), -3.7-102(3)(f), -18-102(9)
(West 2009).
67. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
68. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1490 (West 2009).
69. § 1400(d)(3).
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In explaining neutrality through private choice, the Court shifted its
focus from the nature of the institution to the way in which the institution
received the funding. Essentially, the question became whether the gov-
ernment directly or indirectly provided the aid. The Court determined
that because the government provided aid to the student, and it was his or
her (or his or her parent's) private choice where to use that aid, that the
government was not violating the Establishment Clause.
By settling upon private choice as the correct test by which to
measure neutrality, Zobrest not only declined to entertain the "pervasive-
ly sectarian" nature of the new school, but also discarded the use of the
endorsement test. This case presented a situation where placing a gov-
ernment employee in a sectarian school presented a symbolic union be-
tween the government and the school. The Court unsatisfactorily ad-
dressed (1) the very real appearance that the government was in union
with the institution by nature of providing a government employee at a
sectarian school, and (2) the fact that the government employee would be
relaying religious messages. The only on-point response mustered by the
Court was unconvincing; "the Establishment Clause lays down no abso-
lute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. 73
B. Agostini v. Felton: 74 Folding the Entanglement Inquiry into the Effect
Inquiry
Agostini involved a reconsideration of the Court's prior decision in
Aguilar v. Felton,75 which prohibited New York from "sending public
school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children .... 76 While acknowledging that Lemon still
controlled the inquiry, the Court modified its "understanding of the crite-
ria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect.,
77
This modification "simplified" the Lemon Test by folding the entangle-
ment prong into the effect prong. This change diluted the strength of the
entanglement inquiry by transforming a dispositive issue into merely one
of several factors used to assess secular effect.
78
Practically, this modification permitted the Court to abandon the
presumption that sending state-paid teachers to sectarian schools inevita-
bly results in "the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination
or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion. 79
These words exemplify the consequence of the modification of the "per-
73. Id. at 13.
74. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
75. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
76. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208.
77. Id. at 223.
78. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) ("[W]e therefore recast Lemon's entangle-
ment inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect.").
79. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
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vasively sectarian" doctrine. By downgrading the importance of the en-
tanglement inquiry, the Court effectively weakened the "pervasively
sectarian" standard.
IV. BREAKING DOWN THE WALL: MITCHELL V. HELMS8 °
With the stage set, Mitchell employed the neutrality approach to ex-
plicitly bury the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine. Mitchell represented
the endpoint in the Supreme Court's journey towards full subjectivity.8
Such subjectivity is an impermissible use of the Court's authority, and
has transformed our highest court into "a national theology board. 82
A. Factual Background
Under the Education and Consolidation Act of 1981,83 federal funds
were provided to state educational agencies to improve elementary and
secondary education. These funds were distributed by Local Educational
Authorities ("LEAs") to both public and private schools. 84 Religious
private schools were among the schools qualified to receive federal
funds. However, in an attempt to prevent any possible inference of gov-
ernment sponsorship of religion, the statute included two safeguards.
First, all "services, materials, and equipment" supplied to the schools
was required to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological. 85 Second, pri-
vate schools were required to apply for educational equipment and, if
approved, the equipment was loaned-not given-to the school. 86 De-
spite these safeguards, opponents of the funding program challenged the
legislation as a violation of the Establishment Clause, based upon the
large percentage of sectarian private schools receiving aid.87
B. The End of the "Pervasively Sectarian" Doctrine
The plurality opinion provided four justifications for burying the
"pervasively sectarian" doctrine. First, the relevance of the doctrine in
precedent cases was in "sharp decline., 88 The doctrine had not been used
to strike down an aid program since the 1985 decisions Aguilar and
Ball.89 Indeed, the Court failed to even mention the "pervasively secta-
rian" doctrine in an establishment case decided a mere one year after Ball
80. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
81. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) ('The standards should rather be
viewed as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses
have been impaired.").
82. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
83. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7301-7373 (West 2009).
84. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802.
85. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7217a(a)(1)(A)(i).
86. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7217a(a)(3), (c)(1).
87. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 803-04.
88. Id. at 826.
89. Id.
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and Aguilar.90 Finally, Agostini and Zobrest had upheld aid aimed at
"pervasively sectarian" elementary and secondary schools.91
Second, the Court shifted its emphasis to the private choice of the
individuals, and away from the nature of the institution.92 The Court
argued that in a situation where private choice dictates which institutions
receive government funds, the pervasively sectarian entity had not re-
ceived any special favor from the government.93
Third, the inquiry into the recipient's religious views to determine
whether a school was pervasively sectarian was "not only unnecessary
but also offensive. 94 Such an inquiry raised serious excessive entan-
glement issues.95
Finally, the Court pointed to the bigoted history of hostility towards
pervasively sectarian schools. Opposition to aiding sectarian schools
began in the 1870s, when Congress considered passing the Blaine
Amendment. 96 Promoted by Protestant legislators, the Blaine Amend-
ment would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian
("code for 'Catholic"') institutions.97 "In short," the Court concluded,
"nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasive-
ly sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other
doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be
buried now. 98
V. A POST-MITCHELL LANDSCAPE: COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V.
WEAVER
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Weaver represents the conse-
quence of the discretionary precedent set by Mitchell. Mitchell's ex-
change of the "pervasively sectarian" for a private choice analysis com-
pletely erodes any consistency in the standards for evaluating Establish-
ment claims. Weaver's procedural posture and analysis displayed confu-
sion at both the district and appellate levels, and its holding reflects the
confusion faced by state legislatures.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 827.
92. Id. ("[Tlhe religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis,
so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's secular purpose.").
93. Id. ("If a program offers permissible aid to the religious (including the pervasively secta-
rian), the a religious, and the irreligious, it is a mystery which view of religion the government has
established, and thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would be.").
94. Id. at 828.




98. Id. at 829.
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A. Facts
Colorado provided scholarships to eligible students who attend any
accredited college in the state (public or private, secular or religious) so
long as that institution was not deemed "pervasively sectarian" by gov-
ernment officials.99 The relevant provision had been interpreted, by the
Colorado Commission on Higher Education, to require the fulfillment of
six enumerated criteria: (1) the faculty and students are not exclusively
of one religious persuasion; (2) there is no required attendance at reli-
gious convocations or services; (3) there is a strong commitment to prin-
ciples of academic freedom; (4) there are no required courses in religion
or theology that tend to indoctrinate or proselytize; (5) the governing
board does not reflect nor is the membership limited to persons of any
particular religion; and (6) funds do not come primarily or predominantly
from sources advocating a particular religion.1 °
Colorado Christian University ("CCU") applied to participate in the
financial aid programs in September, 2003. A financial aid officer be-
came skeptical of the application, and upon further review the Commis-
sion concluded that CCU failed three of the six criteria. First, the Com-
mission concluded CCU's courses impermissibly indoctrinated the
school's students. 1 1 Second, CCU's board of trustees reflected a single
religion. 10 2 Third, the university impermissibly required attendance at
religious ceremonies. 10 3 The Commission rejected CCU's application, as
well as the application of Naropa University, but provided funding to
Regis University and University of Denver, both of which are religiously
affiliated1 °4 Therefore, the Commission drew a line between sectarian
schools and "pervasively" sectarian schools. 10 5
B. Procedural Posture
After being denied by the Commission, CCU brought suit alleging
that the funding statutes, and subsequent Commission action, violated the
Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses."' 6 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the state defendants. Confused
as to the proper standard to apply, the district court settled upon rational
99. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
100. Id. at 1250-51.
101. Id. at 1253.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. While the opinion clearly paints the University of Denver ("DU") as a Methodist Institu-
tion, DU's affiliation with the Methodist church is more complex. The Colorado Constitution re-
cognizes the school as "Denver Seminary," and the school does boast a Theological Graduate Pro-
gram. However, as the University Chaplain explains, "there is (as far as I can tell) NO tight connec-
tion. In this way, DU is like Northwestern, Syracuse, USC, and others that have a Methodist herit-
age, but not necessarily a tight linkage." E-mail from Gary R. Brower, University Chaplain, Univer-
sity of Denver, to author (Mar. 25, 2009, 19:01 MST) (on file with author).
105. Id. at 1258.
106. Id. at 1253.
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basis for adjudicating the Free Exercise argument, and heightened scruti-
ny for the Establishment and Equal Protection Clause arguments.1 7 In
finding for the state, the district court allowed the government to justify
its impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause through its inter-
,,108est in "vindicating its state constitution.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Weaver can best be described as dis-
jointed. The court began by seeking answers in recent Supreme Court
precedent, which it interpreted as a statement of legislative discretion.
1°9
Emboldened by this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit included a heigh-
tened scrutiny analysis within the Lemon framework. Yet, wary of pre-
senting too radical an analysis, the Tenth Circuit coupled the heightened
scrutiny analysis with the accepted neutrality approach.
1. A Stepping Stone: Locke v. Davey"
Locke represents the most recent decision by the Supreme Court ad-
dressing the provision of federal funds to religious colleges. Locke reite-
rated the "private choice" holding in Mitchell."' However, the Court
drew a limiting line by prohibiting the use of a government scholarship
to fund a degree in "devotional theology."
The Commission in Weaver argued that "Locke subjects all 'state
decisions about funding religious education' to no more than a 'rational
basis review.""' 2 The Tenth Circuit replied that Locke does not stand for
a rational basis standard, but rather interprets the decision to promote
"balancing interests."'" 3 Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not pursue
this standard, but rather stated, "[w]e need not decide in this case wheth-
er such a balancing test is necessary or how it would be conducted," be-
cause Locke is distinguishable from Weaver." 4 The court found the two
cases distinguishable because (1) the Colorado statute expressly discri-
minates among religions by permitting "sectarian" schools to receive aid,
but not those schools that are "pervasively sectarian," and (2) the charac-
terization as "sectarian" or "pervasively sectarian" entails intrusive go-
107. ld.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1254.
110. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
111. Id. at 719 (stating that "pervasively sectarian" colleges are not necessarily prohibited from
receiving government funds, because the "link between government funds and religious training is
broken by the independent and private choice of recipients").
112. Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1254-55 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 33, Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245
(No. 07-1247), 2007 WL 4778873).
113. Id. at 1255-56 ('"The Court's language [in Locke] suggests the need for balancing inter-
ests: its holding that 'minor burden[s]' and 'milder' forms of 'disfavor' are tolerable in service of
'historic and substantial state interest[s]' implies that major burdens and categorical exclusions from
public benefits might not be permitted in service of lesser or less long-established governmental
ends." (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720, 725 (2004))).
114. Id. at 1256.
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vernmental scrutiny into religious beliefs and practices. 1 5 While the
Tenth Circuit rejected the balancing test, it did borrow the notion of leg-
islative discretion from the opinion. 116
2. Discriminating Among and Within Religions
Responding to CCU's argument that the Colorado statute imper-
missibly discriminated among religions, the State provided three argu-
ments. First, the Commission argued that "Colorado's law . . . distin-
guishes not between types of religions, but between types of institu-
tions.' 17 Second, the Commission argued that "discriminatory funding
is permissible because the State is entitled to discriminate in spending
legislation in ways that it could not if legislating directly."" 8 Third, the
Commission assumed that discrimination in favor of some religions is
permissible as long as the discrimination is not based on "animus." '1 19
In response to the first argument by the Commission, the court dis-
cussed discrimination among religions, a discussion which centered on
the preferential treatment of some religious institutions over others.
120
The court began by addressing the purpose of the Colorado statute, and
found that the "sole function and purpose of the challenged provisions of
Colorado law. . . is to exclude some but not all religious institutions...
,,121 Instead of determining whether the purpose was secular, the Court
stated that this case is subject to "heightened constitutional scrutiny."
122
Yet, the Tenth Circuit did not follow a heightened scrutiny analysis.
Rather, it proceeded to discuss the abolishment of the "pervasively secta-
rian" doctrine in the Supreme Court as well as in other circuits.
123
Second, the Commission argued that "discriminatory funding is
permissible because the State is entitled to discriminate in spending leg-
islation in ways that it could not if legislating directly." 124 The State at-
tempted to parallel government funding choices pertaining to religious
institutions with government funding choices pertaining to healthcare
funding for both abortion and childbirth. 125 The Court did not accept this
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1254 ("There is room for legislative discretion. Locke is the Supreme Court's most
recent and explicit recognition of that discretion.").
117. Brief of Appellees at 51, Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (No. 07-1247), 2007 WL 4778873.
118. Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1259.
119. Id. at 1260.
120. Id. at 1259.
121. Id. at 1258 (citations omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1258-59.
124. Id. at 1259.
125. Id. at 1259-60 (discussing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-318 (1980), and Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
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analogy: "The right to choose abortion is a right to be free of undue bur-
dens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government neutrality."
' 126
Finally, the Commission argued that it may discriminate in favor of
some religions and against others so long as the discrimination was not
based on "animus" against a religion. The Tenth Circuit replied that
while it is certainly necessary that a regulation not be motivated by ani-
mus, it is not sufficient to keep the law constitutional merely because it
was not motivated by animus.
127
3. Intrusive Religious Inquiry: Entanglement Discussion
The Lemon Test came back to life in the final section of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion. After using neutrality and heightened scrutiny to
move through the purpose prong, the court analyzed the effect prong by
focusing on the prohibition of "excessive entanglement" between reli-
gion and government. 128
The Tenth Circuit found two entanglement issues pertaining to the
challenged Colorado provision. First, and most potentially intrusive, was
the requirement that the Commission staff "decide whether any theology
courses required by the university 'tend to indoctrinate or proselyt-
ize. ' ' '129 The court focused on the reasons for disqualifying CCU as a
proper recipient of funds. The court appeared concerned with the
amount of discretion being placed in the hands of a government official
to decide the religious nature of the applicant. 130  For example, the
Commission was left free to define such words as "indoctrinate" and
"proselytize. ' '131
Even more intrusive than defining the terms by which to measure an
institution's religious practice was the actual measurement of those prac-
tices. The court noted that inquiries of such an intrusive nature have
"long been condemned by the Supreme Court."' 32 Moreover, the Tenth
126. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liber-
ty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 177 (2004), quoted in
Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1260.
127. Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1260 ("If First Amendment protections were limited to 'animus,' the
government could favor religions that are traditional, that are comfortable, or whose mores are
compatible with the State, so long as it does not act out of overt hostility to the others.").
128. Id. at 1261 ("Properly understood, the doctrine protects religious institutions from go-
vemmental monitoring or second-guessing of their religious beliefs and practices, whether as a
condition to receiving benefits.., or as a basis for regulation or exclusion from benefits .....
129. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-3.5-105(l)(d) (2008)).
130. See id. at 1261.
131. Id. at 1262.
132. Id. ("The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does or does not have
religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establish-
ment." (citing New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977))).
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Circuit noted that the subjective nature of such an assessment was sus-
ceptible to abuse.
133
The second intrusive entanglement issue presented by the chal-
lenged Colorado law was the assessment of the religious affiliation of the
board of trustees. The Tenth Circuit rightly took issue with government
officials determining what a Catholic, Jewish, or Muslim "policy" on
education would look like. Such an inquiry involves the government
official making conclusions about religion that they are not able to make
without excessively entangling themselves in religion.'
34
4. Governmental Interest
The court ended its analysis by discussing the government's inter-
est. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit validated the use of heightened scruti-
ny in Establishment Clause adjudication. The court assumed, based upon
Supreme Court precedent, that heightened scrutiny should be used as the
analysis for non-entanglement Establishment Clause issues. The Tenth
Circuit stated that "Establishment Clause violations, by contrast, are
usually flatly forbidden without reference to the strength of governmen-
tal purposes. 135 Then, using Larson as its base, which the court admit-
ted stood "alone among Establishment Clause cases," the Tenth Circuit
concluded that "statutes involving discrimination on the basis of religion,
including interdenominational discrimination, are subject to heightened
scrutiny... aris[ing] under the... Establishment Clause... while those
involving other Establishment Clause issues, such as excessive entan-
glement, are unconstitutional without further inquiry."' 36 After stating
the court's proclivity for heightened scrutiny, the court failed to employ
it because it stated that the Commission "scarcely has any justification at
all."
137
D. A Heightened Scrutiny of the Tenth Circuit's Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's confusion over the proper standard became ap-
parent when the court began discussing strict scrutiny. Essentially, dis-
crimination based on religion or between religions will be analyzed using
strict scrutiny whether arising under the Free Exercise Clause (Lukumi);
Establishment Clause (Larson); or Equal Protection Clause (Locke). Yet,
understanding that Lemon is the "enduring standard," the Tenth Circuit
conceded that statutes involving other Establishment clause issues, such
as excessive entanglement, are unconstitutional without further inquiry.
133. Id. at 1262-63 ("The line drawn by the Colorado statute, between 'indoctrination' and
mere education, is highly subjective and susceptible to abuse.... The First Amendment does not
permit government officials to sit as judges of the 'indoctrination' quotient of theology classes.").
134. Id. at 1263.
135. Id. at 1266.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1267.
1108 [Vol. 86:3
2009] COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V. WEAVER 1109
So which is it? By "other Establishment Clause issues,'' 138 is the court
referring to the three prongs of the Lemon Test? The truth is that the
opinion is not clear exactly what standard is to be applied to the variety
of issues present in such an Establishment Clause interpretation.
It appears as though the Tenth Circuit knew that this statutory pro-
vision was unconstitutional based upon the death of the "pervasively
sectarian" doctrine in Mitchell. However, the court's outcome-
determinative analysis produced a soup of standards, and reflected a very
real confusion as to how they should proceed. The opinion referenced
rational basis, heightened scrutiny, the Lemon Test, and even a balancing
test. However, the court never really fully developed any cogent analy-
sis, but instead picked certain aspects of each standard to shoot down the
Commission's arguments.
Perhaps the confusion in Weaver was best revealed during the dis-
cussion of heightened scrutiny. The court used one Supreme Court case
as precedent for its bold assertion, but in the same sentence admitted the
singleness of that opinion.1 39 In application, such a standard would allow
the government to justify its actions, and place the decision of whether
the government's interest is "compelling" in the hands of a judge. That
dynamic leads to the government judging its own actions against a dis-
cretionary standard, instead of against a consistent predictable rule.
VI. AN APPEAL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
When creating the Constitution, our forefathers traded oppression
for freedom. Imbedded within the general idea of freedom is a desire for
religious freedom. 14° The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause stand as twin manifestations of that desire.1 41 Yet, the sublime
language carefully chosen to guard that freedom has placed far too much
discretion with the Supreme Court. 142 The Supreme Court Justices, as a
microcosm of society as a whole, view this language through six differ-
ing, and often competing, lenses. 143  Such discord within the nation's
138. Id. at 1266.
139. Id. (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)).
140. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING
OF A NATION 84 (2006) ("[T]he nation was not 'Christian' but rather a place of people whose expe-
rience with religious violence and the burdens of established churches led them to view religious
liberty as one of humankind's natural rights-a right as natural and as significant as those of thought
and expression.").
141. As John Quincy Adams stated, "Civil liberty can be established on no foundation of
human reason which will not at the same time demonstrate the right to religious freedom ......
Letter from John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson (May 27, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QuiNcy ADAMS 1820-1823, at 466 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1917).
142. This is not to say that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not agree upon the purpose of
the Clauses, but rather they approach its meaning in different ways. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I think it relevant to face up to the fact that
it is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application.").
143. Sees discussion supra Part I.B.
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highest court has clouded our understanding and subsequent interpreta-
tion of the Religion Clauses. Why are these clauses so difficult to under-
stand? While myriad social, philosophic, theocratic, and political factors
could be contemplated, two complementary and inherent reasons that
conspire to frustrate the Religion Clauses stand out.
First, the nature of religion presents a unique challenge. Religion is
such a personal aspect of human life, whether one is a believer or not,
that it stands closer to our hearts than the other liberties protected by the
Bill of Rights. 44 History is pockmarked with drastic actions prompted
by religion. Nations go to war over religion, people commit suicide in
the name of religion, and religion ignites revolutions. The same cannot
be said for the right to trial by jury, the right to reasonable search and
seizure, or the right to bear arms.
Second, the language used to protect religion has failed to enlighten
the modem era. The long line of jurisprudence, from Everson to Locke,
makes clear that even our most exalted arbiters find the language of the
Religion Clauses vague and misleading. 45 Such difficulty with the in-
terpretation of the clauses has led directly to confusion among lower
courts and legislatures. Weaver typifies this dilemma by displaying both
the effect of the Supreme Court's confusion on the Colorado Legislature,
as well as the consequence of lower courts using contrasting precedent.
It is often the duty of lawyers to play with language and to interpret
that language to the client's advantage. Whether it is a constitutional
clause, a statutory provision, or an administrative regulation, vague or
general language can be twisted to support differing propositions. When
vague language creeps into a statute, the state or federal legislative body
can amend the statute, and bring greater clarity and understanding to
society. However, we are often loathe to change the language of the
supreme law of the land-our federal Constitution. But should we be so
unwilling to change our Constitution? Chester Antieau echoed this sen-
timent in his book, A U.S. Constitution for the Year 2000: "Although the
individuals who gave us the original Constitution were great thinkers, it
must be understood that they found it perfectly appropriate for the docu-
ment to be amended whenever the people saw fit."
146
This does, however, raise the question of which parts of the Consti-
tution need clarity, since all aspects of the Constitution need interpreta-
144. See MEACHAM, supra note 140, at 5-6 ("Yet because faith is such an emotional subject for
both believers and nonbelievers, discussion of the question of religion and public life can often be
more divisive than illuminating.").
145. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 221-22 (2d ed. 1994) ("[T]he Court has managed to unite those who stand at polar
opposites on the results that the Court reaches; a strict separationist and a zealous accommodationist
are likely to agree that the Supreme Court would not recognize an establishment of religion if it took
life and bit the justices.").
146. CHESTER JAMES ANTJEAU, A U.S. CONSTITUTION FOR THE YEAR 2000, at vii (1995).
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tion, and Justices often argue as to the correct interpretation. Essentially,
what makes the Religion Clauses so special? Certainly the very nature of
religion elevates these clauses, and when coupled with the "opaque" lan-
guage used to protect religious freedoms, the practicality of a clarifying
amendment becomes clear. Many commentators would dismiss such a
drastic measure, and would instead attempt to persuade the Justices that a.... .147
specific definition or solution is correct. Yet, these commentators miss
the problem. It is not the analysis that is flawed, but the nature of the
Amendment itself. An Amendment that affects our religious freedom by
using broad, malleable language leaves too much to interpretation. The
case law addressing religious freedom screams loudly that now is the
time for change. It is time to bring freedom of religion into the twenty-
first century, and finally clarify what we the people mean by phrases
such as "religious establishment" and "free exercise."
CONCLUSION
Chaos best describes the present state of Establishment Clause juri-
sprudence. This confusion stems from the inherent tension between the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the variety of approaches
created by the Supreme Court to interpret these clauses, and the very
nature of religion itself. The foregoing examination of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence displays the Court's fruitless search for a workable
standard. The failure to create a consistent, workable standard results in
decisions such as Weaver, where lower courts begin to create their own
dysfunctional analysis while staying within the broad framework of the
Lemon Test. One option would be to continue the wild-west showdown
in the Supreme Court and persist on the Court's long journey towards the
prophetical standard. The second option would be to recast the declara-
tion of our religious freedom in clear, contemporary language. The flex-
ible nature of our Constitution not only allows for periodical amendment,
it demands such an amendment when the original language prohibits the
pursuit of justice in the most sacred of liberties.
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